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The question ofthe existence ofa stationary equilibrium for distorted versions ofthe
standard neoclassical growth model is addressed in this paper, The conditions presented
guaranteeing the existence of nontrivial equilibrium for the class of economies under study
are simple and intuitively appealing, while the existence proof developed is elementary.
Examples are presented illustrating that economies with distortional taxation, endogenous
growth with externalities, and monopolistic competition can all fit into the framework
developed.I. INTRODUCfION
A great deal ofwork has re<;ently been devoted to the study ofeconomic environments
which give rise to nonoptimal equilibria [see, for example, Coleman (1991), Greenwood and
Huffman (1991)]. The analysis ofthese environments is not a straightforward application of
results known from dynamic competitive analysis, as in Stokey and Lucas with Prescott (1989),
since the resulting equilibria are not optimal. The usual problem in these environments is
that individual agents fail to take into account how their actions influence the behavior of
other agents. In order to solve an individual agent's dynamic program, one needs to know
the equilibrium law of motion governing the aggregate state of the world, but to know this
in tum requires knowledge ofthe outcome ofdecision-making atthe individual level. Proving
existence ofequilibria can then be problematic, since in these representative agent models it
can be difficult to establish that the individual and aggregate laws of motion for decision
variables coincide along an equilibrium path. Various assumptions have been suggested to
guarantee existence of an equilibrium. It is shown below that a relatively minor",restriction
on the nature of the technology, with no unusually restrictive assumptions placed on
preferences, is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium.
The environment studied below is very similar to the standard neo-classical growth
model, with the notable exception that aggregate decisions can affect the decisions or
resources available to each agent. In particular, there is an externality in the production
technology whereby one agent's investment decisions can influence the productivity ofother
agents. As is illustrated, economies with distortional taxation, endogenous growth with
externalities, and monopolistic competition can be cast into this general framework.
The analysis conducted below borrows ingredients from Coleman (1991) and
Greenwood and Huffman (1991). In particular, following the innovative work of Coleman
(1991), the existence ofequilibrium is established by constructing a monotone operatorwhich
maps the aggregate law ofmotion into itself. Coleman's (1991) strategy for proving existence
is generalized and significantly simplified in two ways: first, by adopting a less restrictive and
more intuitive set of assumptions on tastes and technology outlined in Greenwood and
Huffman (1991); and second, by employing a simpler line of argument to prove that the fixed
point to the monotone operator is an equilibrium for the economy under study. The end
result of combining components from the above two analyses is an existence proof that is
1much simpler than that contained in either work, despite the greater generality of the
argument being pursued. Another benefit of the present approach is that the assumptions
employed below would appear to be readily verifiable for a variety of environments.
II. THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The economy under consideration is one which is very similar to the discrete-time
standard neo-classical growth model. There is a continuum (of measure one) of identical




where E['J is the expectation operator, {3 is the discount factor, and C, represents consumption
in period t. The momentary utility function U(.): 3t+ -+ 3t+ is strictly increasing, strictly
concave, and twice differentiable and U'(0) = 00.
Each agent is endowed with the same production technology which is wrftten in the
following form:
y, = F(k"K,.'Y/,).
Here, y, represents output ofthe consumption good in period t, and k, is the agent's private
input ofcapital into the production process which was chosen in period t-l. The variable 111
is a random technology shock which is known at the beginning ofperiod t. It is drawn from
the bounded set A and has a Markov distribution function which will be denoted as
G(111+1111,). The variable I(, represents the average or per capita quantity ofcapital supplied
by all agents in the economy. Each agent, being of measure zero, behaves as though his
choice ofcapital stock k, has no influence on the average capital stock 1(,. As is conventional,
it is assumed that the production technology is strictly increasing and strictly concave in its
first argument, and twice differentiable in its first two arguments. Other than the restrictions
described below, no further constraints are placed on the technology with respect to the
influence of the remaining two arguments.




F(k,K,T/) > 0, 'tI k, K > 0, and limK_ o F\(K,K,T/)= 00.
3 K 3 F(K,K,T/) S K.
For all K E (0, K],
F\(K,K,T/) + FiK,K,T/) ~ 0,
and
These assumptions seem relatively innocuous. The first assumption places relatively
standard restrictions on the production technology. The second merely places a convenient
upper bound on the level of output, or capital stock in the economy, which is satisfied for
almost all parameterized versions of the concave technology. The third assumption places
benign restrictions on how aggregate capital can affect the individual technology. It requires
that the social marginal product of capital (or the sum of the marginal prody.cts of the
individual and aggregate stocks) be positive. Additionally, it is necessary that the social
returns to capital are diminishing in the individual capital stock. Observe these properties
need only hold locally "along an equilibrium path" where k=K. Itwould seem easy to check
that these simple properties hold for a wide range of economic problems. Additionally, it
should be recognized that these appear to be much less restrictive assumptions than those
imposed on the production and utility functions in Coleman (1991).\
Finally, output in each period must be used for either consumption or investment
purposes. Thus,
where k'+l is the amount of the consumption good used for investment at date t which
becomes productive capital in the following period.
III. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA
The representative agent's dynamic programming problem for the environment under
study can be cast as
3V(k,K,l1) = max (U(F(k,K'l1) - k') + ,8fV(k',K',l1')dG(l1'll1 )1, (PI)
k'
where the aggregate K evolves exogenously according to the nontrivial law of motion K' =
Q(K,1/). Assume that this aggregate law of motion is nontrivial in the sense that Q(K,1/) >
ofor K > O. Now let the optimal decision-rule associated with the above problem be denoted
by k' = q(k,K,1/). An important property ofthis decision-rule is that q(k,K,1/) < F(k,K,1/) if
k,K > 0.2 Standard arguments can be used to show that the any interior solution for this
decision-rule must satisfy the Euler equation (1) shown below.
U'(F(k,K,l1) - k') = f3JU'(F(k',K',l1') - k")F,(k',K',l1')dG(l1'll1)' (1)
Now, the economy under study is one where all agents are identical. In equilibrium,
therefore, the decision-rule regulating the individual's capital accumulation must coincide with
the law of motion governing the evolution of the aggregate capital stock. The following
definition makes this notion more precise: "-
Definition: A stationary equilibrium for the environment described above is a pair of
functions k' = q(k,K,1/) and K' = Q(k,1/) such that
(i) the decision-rule for each agent, k' = q(k,K,1/), solves the optimization problem (PI),
and
(ii) the individual's decision-rule is consistent with the law ofmotion for the aggregate per
capita capital stock, or q(K,K,1/) = Q(K,1/).
From the above definition ofan equilibrium, it is clear that ifan aggregate law ofmotion for
capital of the form 0 < K' = Q(K,1/) < F(K,1/), for K > 0, exists, then it must satisfy
equation (2)
U'(F(K,K,l1) - K') = ,8JU'(F(K',K',l1') - KI/)F,(K',K',l1')dG(l1'll1), (2)
where K" = Q(Q(K,1/),1/').
4Proposition: There exists a nontrivial stationary equilibrium for the economy
described above.
Proof:
A. Construction ofthe Aggregate Law ofMotion
Consider the sequence of aggregate laws of motion {Hi(K,l1)}~i=o that are generated
recursively as follows: First define ~(K,11) = O. Second, define Hi+\K,rj) to be the solution
for x in the Euler equation shown below
U'(F(K,K,,,) - x) = /3fU'(F(x,x,,,') - Hi(x,T//»F1(x,x,T/')dG(T/'!T/). (3)
Thus, equation (3) implicitly defines an operator mapping the function Hi into Hi+l.3 Now
assume that
(4)
which certainly holds for j=O. The left-hand side of equation (3) is strictly increasing in x,
and the right-hand side is decreasing in x by Assumption (iii) and equation (4). Hence, there
exists a unique solution to equation (3), and consequently 0 < H(K,l1) < F(K,K,l1) for K>O,
j2:1, by Assumption (i). Note also that if the capital stock K increases by a unit, then output
increases by the amount [F1(K,K,11) + F,(K,K,l1)]. Then it is easily shown that
(5)
It is also seen from equation (3) that replacing H(K,l1) by a function that is everywhere
greater results in a larger solution for x. In other words, this procedure generates a
monotonically increasing sequence of laws of motion for the aggregate capital stock
{Hj(K,l1)}~j=o defined on [O,K]XA. Furthermore, this sequence is bounded from above by K
[see Assumption (ii)]. Let
so that Q(',) is the pointwise limit of the functions Hi(") which exists because
{Hi(K,1J)} ~i=o is a monotonically increasing bounded sequence. Since H(O,l1) = 0 for all j,
5then Q(O,7/) = °as well. Note from (4) that aH
j+l(K,1])laK is bounded from above by
F,(K,K,1]) + F2(K,K,1]), for all j, and hence the sequence {Hj+l(K,7/)}~j=o is equicontinuous on
[I;, K.] for all I; E (O,K.]. Therefore, the sequence {Hj+'(K,7/)}~i=o converges uniformly oneach
closed interval to Q(.,), which must also be a function continuous in its first argument [by
the Arzela-Ascoli theorem and theorem 7.13, Rudin (1976»).4 Furthermore, Q(.,) must also
satisfy the restriction given by equation (4), with the derivative interpreted as a finite
difference.
Is the function Q(K,7/) = limi_~ H(K,1]) constructed above a good candidate for an
equilibrium aggregate law of motion? To answer this question, suppose that Q(K,7/) <
F(K,K,7/) for K E (0, K.] and 7/ E A. By construction, the function K' = Q(K,7/) satisfies
equation (2). Furthermore, given this aggregate law ofmotion, there exists a unique decision-
rule k' = q(k,K,1]) which solves the Euler equation (1). Clearly, when k = K, it transpires
that q(K,K,7/) = Q(K,7/) solves (1) since Q(K,1]) satisfied (2). Thus, for the case when Q(K,1])
< F(K,K,7/) for all K ...°an equilibrium has been found. To complete the exis~nce proof
it will be shown next that Q(K,1]) = limi_= Hi(K,1]) ... F(K,K,1]) for K E (0, K.) and 7/ E A.
Remark: Observe that for any finite T, the sequence {Hj(K,1])}Tj=O gives the unique set of
T+1 laws of motion that obtain from a T-period version of the economy under study.
B. Nondegenerateness ofthe Aggregate Law ofMotion
It is important to ensure that the aggregate laws of motion do not converge to a
degenerate case where investment equals total output. For instance, consider the possibility
that Q(K,1]) = F(K,K,7/) for all K and 1]. While this solution for the aggregate law ofmotion
will trivially satisfy (2), it cannot constitute an equilibrium for the economy under study since
(P1) demands a solution for the representative agent's decision-rule such that q(k,K,7/) <
F(k,K,7/) whenever k, K > O.
To rule out such degenerate cases, consider the sequence ofvalue functions {VOr0=0
generated from the mapping
V"(k,K,1) = max W(F(k,K,1) - k') + (31V"-'(k',K',1)')dG(1)'I1) )1, (P2)
k'
where K' = Q(K,1]). Without loss ofgenerality, assume that yo =0. Well-known arguments
can be employed to show that this mapping defines an operator T, such that yo = TVD-" that
6has as its unique fixed point the function Y characterized by (PI).
Now let {Qi}nj=o be a sequence of continuous functions converging uniformly to the
,
function Q on [0, K] xA. Next, consider the sequence ofvalue functions {yn}~ n~O generated
from the mapping
v" (k,K,1) = max (U(F(k,K,T/) - k') + pfV",1 (k',K',1)')dG(T/'IT/ )}, (PJ)
k'
with K' = Qn-I(K,1). Set yo == 0. Let the optimal decision-rule associated with (P3) be
,
denoted by k' = qn-l(k,K,1J). A key step in the subsequent analysis is to show that limn_~ yn
= Y, where Y is the fixed point to equation (PI).'
,
Assume momentarily that indeed limn_~ y n = Y. Given this supposition, it is easy to
demonstrate that Q(K,1J) < F(K,K,1J) for K E (0, K] and 1J E A. Note that the sequence of
functions {Hn}~n=O constructed in the previous subsection satisfies the properties assumedfor
the sequence {Qn}~n~o that underlies the mapping (P3). Therefore let Qn = Hnfor all n.
Then by the construction of mapping (P3), qn(K,K,1J) = H"(K,1J) for K E [0, K] ~nd 1J E A.
Now, consider the sequence of functions {W"-I}n~=1 where W".I(k',K,1J,1J') -
,
yn-l(k',Qn-I(K,1J),1J'). Clearly, this sequence converges to the function W(k',K,1J,1J') ==
Y(k',Q(K,1J),1J') by the assumption made above. Since the functions WandWi, for all n<!:2,
are each strictly concave in their first argument it follows that qn-I(k,K,1J) ..... q(k,K,1J),
pointwise." Consequently, Q(K,1J) < F(K,1J) for K ~ 0, since the solution of the problem
(PI) dictates that q(k,K,1J) < F(k,K,1J) for k,K > 0.
,
All that remains to be established is that limn_~ Yn ..... Y. Toward this end, note the
following fact for future use.
Fact 1: Since va ..... Y uniformly, for all e > 0, there exists an N such that for n <!: N
1V"(k,K,T/) - V(k,K,T/)1 ,;; 6/3,
for all k,K E [O,K], 1J E A.
Next, define the continuous function 1Tq: [O,K] xAq ..... lJt. recursively by
where 1T
0 == Ko. The function 1Tq gives the period-q aggregate capital stock assuming that the
7initial period-zero capital stock is K", the history of shocks {1],}q-\=o transpires, and the law
of motion Q is followed.
Likewise, define the continuous function ~q:[O,KjXAq ..... lll+> for m ~ q ~ 1,
recursively by
with ~o ,.. K". The function ~ gives the period-q aggregate capital stock for the economy
with an m-period horizon, assuming that the law of motion Qm-I-! is followed in period t (for
t :s; q-l) and contingent upon the initial period-zero capital having the value K", and the
history ofshocks {1].}r~o being realized. Note that since Qi ..... Q uniformly, lim",_~ ~q = 'l!'q
for all q > O. This is easily seen to imply Fact 2, which will be used in the subsequent
analysis.
Fact 2: Since U(-) and F(·) are continuous functions, and the sequence {Oil converges
uniformly to Q, for all q and e > 0, there exists an M such that for m ~ M ~ max(q,I),
IU(F(k,.rrm·'(·),"I,) - k') - U(F(k,w'('),"I,) - k')!
for k, k', K" E [0, Kj, {1]0> 1]1> ..., 1],} E At+t, and 0 oS t :s; q.
:S (1 - 13)e
3 '
Finally, Fact 3 (which is trivial) is noted.
Fact 3: Let B ,.. max".A [U(F(K, K, 1]))]. For each /; > 0, there exists a P such that for




Proof: Pick e > 0 and choose Nand P such that Facts 1 and 3 hold. Next, let q =
max[N,Pj andchoose M ~ max(q,l) large enough so that Fact 2 holds as well. Now note that
8where the expectation operator E(·) reflects the integration with respect to the finite
probability distribution of {1]j}j~~. First, set m;;:·M. By Fact 3itfollows that
since q ;;: P. Second, Fact 2 then implies
Third, since q > N, it immediately transpires from Fact 1 that
o
IV. DISCUSSION
The form for the production technology, y = F(k,K,1]), is a general formulation that
could embody many environments. The following three examples may help to illustrate this
point.
Example 1: Distortional Taxation. Let the representative agent's production function be
described by y = Y(k,1]) + (1-8)k, where Y has the standard production function properties.
Note that under this formulation capital depreciates at the rate 8. Now suppose that there
is a government in the economy that taxes income at the rate 9 and provides a capital
consumption allowance of IJ. The resulting tax revenue is rebated back to the agent via a
lump-sum transfer payment. This environment can be handled in the above framework by
9adopting the following specification for F(k,K,7/):
It is straightforward to check that Assumptions (i), (H) and (Hi) are satisfied. Additionally,
this framework can also accommodate a progressive income tax structure. To do this let 8
be given by 8 = 0(k,7/). It is easily seen that, so long as the individual's after-tax income
[1-0(k,7/)J[Y(k,7/) + (1 - ~(1 - I-I»k] is both strictly increasing and strictly concave in k, then
the required assumptions are satisfied.
Furthermore, it is easy to incorporate a variable supply of labor into the analysis.
Now, let the representative agent's preferences be described by U(c - G(t'», where G(·) is
an increasing convex function.
7 The technology is specified as y = Y(k,t',7/), where t'
represents his labor input. Also, suppose that the government taxes labor income at the rate
l. Define the function L(k,7/) by
L(k,7/) = atgm~{(1-8)Y(k,x,7/)-[(1-8)/(I-l)]G(x)}. "
x
To recast the environment into the framework developed, let F(k,K,7/) be given by
F(k,K,7/) =(1 - 8)Y(k,L(k,7/),'T/) + [1 - ~(1 - I-I)]k - [(1 - 8)/(1 - l)]G(L(k,7/»
+ 8Y(K,L(K,7/),7/) - I-I~K + [(l - 8)/(1 - l)]G(L(K,7/».
While now a little more difficult to verify, F(k,K,7/) satisfies Assumptions (i), (H) and (iH).
The representative agent's dynamic programming problem can again be characterized as (PI),
given this formulation for F(k,K,7/).
Example 2: Endogenous Growth with Externalities. Consider a simple version of Romer's
(1986) well-known economic growth model. First, let the representative agent's preferences
be described by EI3't'n(c,) . Second, suppose the production technology is given by y =
1:0
7/Y(k,K), where Y is linearly homogeneous in its first two arguments with the standard
properties holding otherwise. With this combination of tastes and technology it is possible
for the economy to grow without bound. The model, however, has a stationary representation
10that can be handled in the framework developed above. To see this, define the variables c,
k', and K' byc= clK, k' = k'lK, and K' = K'IK.
8 Next, let F(k;K,1J) be represented by
~ A A A
F(k,K,1J) = 1JY(kIK,l). Observe that F satisfies Assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii), with F, + F2 . .
= 0 when k = K.
Now, it is easy to deduce that the representative agent's dynamic programming
problem (PI) canbe rewritten for the current ~xample in transformed form as
A A A A A
V(k,K,1J) = max {en[F(k,K,1J)-k'j + ,8fV(k',K',1J')dG(1J'I1J)}, (P4)
k'
A .... ... ...
where K' =Q(K,1J) . Since F, + F2 = 0, when k = K it is immediate from (4) that the
.
equilibrium law of motion can be expressed more simply as K' = Q(1J). Clearly then, the
solution for the original model is homogeneous ofdegree one in the aggregate capital stock.
Also, it is easy to check by solving (P4) that Q(1J) = 1J,8F,(I,I).9 The economy will
experience growth if E(1J)F1(1,1) > 1/,8. ;.
Example 3: MonoPOlistic Competition. A simple stochastic infinite horizon version of
Kiyotaki's (1988) model ofmonopolistic competition also fits into the framework developed.
Imagine an economy inhabited by a continuum of agents distributed uniformly over the unit
interval. Agents are identical except that each owns a firm producing a differentiated
~ I
product. The generic individual's preferences are described by L ,8'en[f I c,(8)Pd8fp, for
,.0 0
o< P < 1, where <;(8) represents his period-t consumption ofthe good produced by agent
8. The representative agent's firm produces output according to the linear production
technology y = 1Jk, where 1J is an aggregate technology shock. An individual's capital
accumulation is governed by the technology k' = [foi(8)'d8jl/p, where i(8) is the amount of
goods purchased from agent 8 for investment purposes. Finally, the agent's budget constraint
for any given period reads J'op(8)[c(8) + i(8)]d8 = p1Jk, where p(8) is the price for good 8.
Now, by carrying out the implied within-period maximization, it is easy to deduce that
c(8) = [p(8)/P]1/(,·ll[rop( ~)c( ~)d~/P] and i(8) = [p(8)/P]1/(p·ll[J\p(~)i(~)d~/P], with the
aggregate price level P being given by [fop(~)PI(p")d~]("')lp. Next, define c and k' by c =
[roe(8)Pd8]IIP and k' = [J\i(8)Pd8]IIP . The agent's preferences can now be represented
11more simply by L {J'lne,
'00
Also, using the above formulae it is apparent that
c = f'op(6)c(6)d6IP and k' = f'op(6)i(6)d6IP. This allows the individual's budget constraint
to be given the more compact representation c + k' = (pIP)1)k. Observe that the demand,
y, for the agent's firm's product is described by y = (pIP)"Cp"ly, where aggregate demand Y
is defined by Y = f p(6)[C(6) + 1(6)]d6IP andC(6) and 1(6) represent the aggregate amounts
of good 6 that are demanded for consumption and investment purposes. Thus, pIP =
(1)k/Y)P-" as y = 1)k. Since in equilibrium each industry behaves the same, it must transpire
that Y = 1)K, where K is the average or aggregate level ofthe capital stock. Therefore the
representative agent's budget constraint can be reformUlated as c + k' = 1)kP K'-p. The
agent's intertemporal optimization problem amounts to choosing c and k' in each period so
as to maximize expected lifetime utility. The problem now has the form of Example 2.
Observe that the economy can grow without bound.
12FOOTNOTES
1. In particular, Assumption 5 in Coleman (1991) assumes that there is not "too much"
uncertainty about the production function disturbances. No such assumption is needed in the
present analysis, as the degree ofuncertainty is unrestricted.
2. Suppose to the contrarythat q(k,K,'1) = F(K,'1) for some k, K > O. To show that this
strategy of consuming nothing cannot be optimal, consider increasing current consumption, and
correspondingly reducing current investment, by some amount e > O. On the one hand, the
resulting perunit gain in current utility will be [U(e) - U(O)]/e. Onthe other hand, the per unit loss
in expected future utility is (,Bf[V(k',K','1') - V(k'-e,K"'1')]dG('1'I '1»/6. Now since U'(O)=oo, this
per unit gain can be made arbitrarily large by picking E small enough. Theper unit loss is bounded
in size, however, since the solution for V(.) in (PI) is a continuous, bounded function that is both
strictly increasing and strictly concave in its first argument.
3. This mapping forms the basis for numerical algorithms to solve nonlinear dynamic
stochastic models that have been proposed by Baxter (1991), Coleman (1990), and D!Uthine and
Donaldson (1990). See Danthine and Donaldson (1993) for a discussion of these types of
algorithms. Also, Greenwood and Huffman (1987) and Lucas and Stokey (1987) use similar
mappings to establish the existence, and characterize the properties, of equilibriums for cash-in-
advance models.
4. Specifically, the Arzela-Ascoli theorem implies that the limiting function is continuous
in its first argument, while the theorem inRudin (1976) establishes that theconvergence is unifonn
since the sequence is monotone.
5. Here the norm employed is I V I = sup. IV(xi , x" x,) I, where x = (XI> x" x,) E
[O,K]X[O,K]xA. Similarly, the nonn for the convergence of the functions {Qi}=;_o is also the sup
norm.
6. See Lucas, Stokey, with Prescott (1989), Theorem 9.9.
7. This form of utility function has been used in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman
(1988) and Hercowitz and Sampson (1991). These analyses suggest that for the study ofbusiness
cycles the restrictions imposed by this sort ofutility may not be that severe.
8. Coleman (1993) and Gomme (1993) use this transfonnation in computational work to
obtain stationary solutions for endogenous growth models.
9. Note that Fi(k,K,'1) = '1Fi(I,I).
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